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COURT ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION:
PROVISIONS FOR NEW CONTRACTS
Whether or not a court, acting under Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act,' should compel arbitration concerning the terms of a
new contract between an employer and a union, as provided for in their col-
lective bargaining agreement, was recently before the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Union v. Piedmont
Publishing Co. 2 The case involved a union-instituted suit which asked the
court to grant damages and compel the company to arbitrate. The collective
bargaining agreement was one which was to run from year to year. Were
either party to desire to change the agreement, provision was made for nego-
tiations and, negotiations failing, there was provision for arbitration of the
terms of a new contract. Affirming the lower court,' the Fourth Circuit held
that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration. 4
In so doing, the court put another nail in the coffin of an opinion by
Judge Wyzanski, Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press,5 which
had refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate new contract terms. The
Potter Press case was the first judicial decision on this question and had
remained an important case in the area long after it appeared that it was
inconsistent with subsequent United States Supreme Court cases. Potter Press
distinguished between compelling arbitration for past grievances ("quasi-
judicial" arbitration) and arbitration for new contracts ("quasi-legislative"
arbitration).° The distinction, determined the Fourth Circuit in Piedmont,
is no longer valid when viewed in the light of these subsequent cases develop-
ing "national labor policy" toward arbitration.?
This comment will attempt to show that Potter Press was a decision
which can be understood only through a knowledge of the immediate legal
environment in which it was decided, to show how this legal environment has
changed since Potter Press through subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
and to show that the Piedmont decision was the inevitable result of this
change. It will attempt also to place new contract arbitration in the general
context of labor-management relations. Regarding the legal environment of
Potter Press, the comment will attempt to illustrate that Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act was under both a confusing and a restricted
interpretation at the time of Potter Press, and that it was this interpretation
which may have led Judge Wyzanski to develop a questionable distinction
between grievance and new contract arbitration.
1 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1965).
2 393 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1968).
3 263 F. Supp. 952 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
4 393 F.2d at 228.
5 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 817 (1957).
Id. at 556.
7 393 F.2d at 223-24.
159
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 301: BEFORE Potter Press
An examination of the language of the pertinent parts of section 301 8
does not provide a great deal of insight into either its purpose or scope, and
numerous questions arose shortly after its enactment concerning its effect
upon arbitration agreements. The first was whether section 301 was jurisdic-
tional only, in which case courts would apply state common law to arbitration
provisions. If section 301 was more than jurisdictional, the next question
presented was what form of federal law should apply to proceedings under
it. Some courts indicated that federal common law should apply,9 while at
least one other court seemed to indicate that only federal statutory law
could govern the proceedings under section 301. 10
One of the early cases to consider the problems presented by section
301 was an opinion by Judge Wyzanski, Textile Workers Union v. American
Thread Co. 11 In that case, the union instituted a suit to compel arbitration
to determine whether the defendant was liable for separation pay under the
collective bargaining agreement. Judge Wyzanski decided that the common
law of the states was not the applicable law under section 301, 12 and that
federal statutes other than section 301 were not needed to give substance to
the jurisdiction conferred by section 301. 13 Having thus concluded, Judge
Wyzanski then had to decide, by application of the federal common law,
whether to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. He concluded, through an
examination of the "thin" legislative history of the section, "that § 301 pro-
8
 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1965).
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship.
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Responsibility for acts of agents; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement
of money judgments.
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect
commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets.
9 See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437, 452 (1955).
" Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 97 (1st
Cir. 1936).
II 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
12 ' , Congress, had it considered the matter, would have expected federal courts to
accord specific performance of arbitration clauses, and would not expect the national
judiciary to apply a checker-board set of remedies adapted to the laws of the several
states, most of which do not provide for specific performance of arbitration clauses in
labor contracts." Id. at 141.
13 Cf. id. at 141-42.
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vides, as a nationally available remedy, specific performance of arbitration
clauses in labor contracts in industries affecting commerce."14
Had American Thread been adhered to in the next few years (1953-
1956) it would have provided a sufficiently strong basis for Judge Wyzanski,
in Potter Press, to enforce an agreement to arbitrate new contract terms.
However, the decision in American Thread was weakened, not strengthened,
during this period. Two important cases cast doubts upon the continued
validity of the decision by narrowing the scope of section 301 concerning its
use in enforcing collective bargaining agreements, and by confusing some of
the basic questions concerning which law should apply under the section.
The first of these cases was the Supreme Court pronouncement in Association
of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 15
 West-
inghouse was an action brought by an unincorporated labor organization
seeking a declaratory judgement against the company, alleging that the com-
pany had withheld wages from certain employees, in violation of their collec-
tive bargaining agreement. It was the first United States Supreme Court
decision under section 301, and thus was to be very important in setting the
tone of national labor policy, as expressed by the Court, under the section.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton and Minton, held that federal
courts did not have jurisdiction under section 301 to hear the case."
Reading the statute under the "meaning [that] its language spontane-
ously yields," Justice Frankfurter stated, "it would seem clear that all it does
is to give procedural direction to the federal courts." 17 To determine the mean-
ing and scope of section 301, continued Justice Frankfurter, the Court must go
beyond the language of the statute to its congressional history." In examining
this legislative history, he again concluded that section 301 was procedural or
jurisdictional in nature, and was not intended as a means for the creation of
a body of federal law to be used in the enforcement of labor agreements."
Having so decided, he then raised a constitutional question concerning the
power of Congress to increase federal jurisdiction in this manner," and
expressed misgivings about the problems likely to result from the application
of federal law in such situations: "To turn § 301 into an agency for working
out a viable theory of the nature of a collective bargaining agreement smacks
of unreality. ,21
After this analysis, which suggested that state law should apply in section
301 cases, Justice Frankfurter followed an alternative path and concluded
that the problems that he had raised could be avoided by the holding that
section 301 was not designed to involve cases concerning the rights of an
individual, as opposed to the rights of a union, under an employment con-
tr ct." •
14 Id. at 141.
15
 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
10 Id. at 461.
17 Id. at 443.
18 Id. at 444.
19 See id. at 449.
20 Id,
21 Id. at 456.
22 Id. at 459-60.
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The Westinghouse case drew two concurring opinions and one dissent,
which are important in that they demonstrate the Supreme Court's lack of a
unified interpretation of section 301. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark
stated that section 301 was not designed to help enforce "uniquely personal"
rights of an employee, and that consequently there was no need to raise the
problems that had been discussed in the majority opinion. 23 Justice Reed took
the position that section 301 was not designed to enforce separate contracts
between each employee and the employer, but that generally, federal law
should apply under section 301. 24 Finally, Justices Douglas and Black dis-
sented, saying that the case before the Court should come under section 301
and that federal law should apply to the proceedings. 25
Westinghouse succeeded in presenting several problems that must be
recognized for an understanding of the Potter Press case. First, the majority
opinion seemed to imply that section 301 was to be viewed in a restrictive
sense and not as a means for providing federal substantive law for the settling
of labor disputes. 26 Second, the majority opinion left unanswered several
questions, including: the constitutionality of congressional delegation of
authority to the courts, and the problems involved in applying federal law
under the section. Finally, the fact that Justice Frankfurter held that the
section was not to be applied because the issue in question involved personal
employee rights opened to dispute the binding effect on lower federal courts
of the remaining discussion in the opinion. 27
These several problems left Judge Wyzanski's opinion* in American
Thread on extremely unstable grounds, and created numerous obstacles for
his decision in Potter Press. That these difficulties troubled Judge Wyzanski
is clear from his statement in Potter Press:
Recalling with what a jaundiced eye § 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Act has been viewed by some justices of the Supreme Court
... [in Westinghouse] and with what difficulty the courts in this
circuit were led to the doctrine of . . . [American Thread], this
Court deems it undesirable to jump into what may be a bottomless
pit of dispute over future working conditions. 28
Westinghouse, as a setback for American Thread and section 301, may
have been sufficient in itself to produce the result in Potter Press, but when
coupled with the First Circuit opinion in Local 205, United Electrical
23 Id. at 461.
24 Id. at 461-64.
25 Id. at 465.
26 "Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton subjected the section to a forced, indeed
it may be thought, to an emasculating reading which enabled them on the facts before
them to hold it inapplicable." Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1957). It is submitted that this
forced reading prevented federal court judges from using section 301 to develop national
labor policy.
27 "1 The holding of the case [Westinghouse] left federal judges without guidance
in damage actions not involving 'uniquely personal' employee rights." Wellington, Judge
Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1268, 1271 (1959).
28 141 F. Supp. at 557.
162
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
Workers v. General Elec. Co., 29 it appears that Judge Wyzanski had little
choice in his decision in Potter Press. General Electric involved a suit by a
labor union for specific performance of arbitration provisions in a collective
bargaining contract. The First Circuit implied that section 301 conferred more
than jurisdiction upon federal courts, but that federal common law was not
the substantive law to be applied. Although the court was familiar with
American Thread, it nevertheless concluded that "a firmer statutory basis
than § 301 should be found to justify departure from the judicially formu-
lated doctrines with reference to arbitration agreements."30 In examining
other legislation which might provide the basis, the court first dealt with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and a possible conflict between it and section
301. The court resolved the conflict by holding that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not prevent a federal court from issuing an injunction under the
authority conferred by section 301. 31 The court then looked to the United
States Arbitration Act. It found that this Act provided sufficient authority
to enforce the arbitration provision,32 despite the provision in the Act reading,
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce." 33
Thus, in Potter Press Judge Wyzanski was faced with a Supreme Court
decision saying that state law should apply in section 301 proceedings, and
an opinion in his own circuit stating that, although federal law would apply,
he would need to look for a statutory basis upon which to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate the terms of a new contract. It is clear that the policy
expressed by American Thread involved a liberal interpretation of section
301 regarding court enforcement of arbitration agreements and the general
importance of section 301. It had viewed the section as a means for devel-
oping a national labor policy which would attempt to reduce industrial dis-
putes through enforcement of the means chosen by the parties for the reso-
lution of their disputes.
However, this liberal interpretation was replaced by a narrow interpre-
tation during the time between American Thread and Potter Press. It is
submitted that Judge Wyzanski, as the author of American Thread, did not
desire to hold that no arbitration agreements could be enforced by courts.
Yet, in light of the Westinghouse and General Electric opinions, he would
need some justification to enforce such agreements. To resolve this difficulty,
he distinguished between two forms of arbitration: quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial, enforcing only the latter. If quasi-legislative arbitration is
considered to be a slightly more progressive form of handling labor-man-
agement disputes than is grievance arbitration," it follows that a strong
29 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956).
39 Id. at 97.
31 Id. at 91.
32 Id. at 97-98.
33 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1953).
84 Grievance arbitration involves determining the rights that have grown out of past
actions. These usually relate to specific complaints by either employees or employers and
are reasonably close to the traditional judicial function of conflict resolution. New con-
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foundation for section 301 would be needed before a judge would feel secure
in compelling the former. As has been indicated, this foundation was wholly
lacking at the time that Potter Press was decided.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
In examining the actual distinction between grievance arbitration and
new contract arbitration, Judge Wyzanski looked for a statutory basis to
enforce the latter. He concluded that enforcement of quasi-legislative arbi-
tration provisions was not intended by Congress under section 301 alone,
nor under the United States Arbitration Act when read in conjunction with
section 301, and that judges should be very careful before entering the deli-
cate area of labor negotiations." Several arguments have been advanced in
support of the distinction. One line of reasoning suggests that compelling
arbitration for new contracts will remove a necessary impetus for agreement
during the collective bargaining between the parties." If the parties know
that arbitration, rather than a strike or lockout, will result should they
fail to reach an agreement, there will obviously be Iess pressure to reach an
agreement. This argument is closely related to the "free play" argument
advanced by the late Dean Shulman." The free play argument concludes
that the process of arbitration functions at its best when it is least interfered
with by the courts. There is a weakness to both these arguments since both
can be applied to grievance arbitration (in fact, the free play discussion
was originally advanced in that capacity) and neither is limited to new
contract arbitration. Therefore, these arguments do not support a distinction
between the two forms of arbitration.
Another argument against court enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements which provide for arbitration of new contracts relates to the
general views of the parties toward the collective bargaining contract. Gen-
erally, management likes to reassess its overall economic position within its
industry and its position in relation to its employees at the end of the con-
tract period. At the same time, unions like to reassess their position in
relation both to management and to other workers in the same or similar
industries. This reassessment is then taken into account by both parties in bar-
tract arbitration, however, has been looked upon as a "prospective" device for the resolu-
tion of conflicts concerning future conditions, and thus does not fit the traditional mode
of judicial function. As will be seen, this distinction is questionable. See 52 Nw. U.L. Rev.
284 (1957).
33 141 F. Supp. at 556-58.
36
 64 Colum. L. Rev. 109, 113 (1964); 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 269, 271-72 (1956).
37
 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999
(1955). The theory is best stated in Dean Shulman's often quoted words:
But the courts cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, restore the parties'
continuing relationship; and their intervention in such cases may seriously affect
the going systems of self-government. When their autonomous system breaks
down, might not the parties better be left to the usual methods for adjustment
of labor disputes rather than to court actions on the contract or on the arbitra-
tion award? I suggest that the law stay out—but, mind you, not the lawyers.
Id. at 1024.
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gaining for a new contract. According to this argument, arbitration for new
contracts is unwarranted for it tends to bind the parties longer than either
feels is practical." A difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it appears to
be relevant only at the stage when the collective bargaining contract is being
written, and not to a discussion of court enforcement of such agreements,
for it relates to whether or not such provisions should be written into the
contract. If it is accepted that collective bargaining constitutes a give and
take process wherein one party "wins" the right to have new contract terms
arbitrated (and thus realizes both the drawbacks and the advantages of
such arbitration), then it follows that courts should not refuse to enforce
these provisions.
Related to the above argument against arbitration is the fact that arbi-
tration for new contracts creates a large risk for both parties in that the
issues are considerably less limited than those in grievance arbitration."
Neither management nor unions are willing to accept this risk in the form
of an unreasonable contract, and both, in most cases, feel that they can
minimize the risk by having the contract decided by the collective bargain-
ing process without third party interference. However, this argument also
is a reason for not having such provisions in the collective bargaining con-
tract, and is not a reason for non-enforcement of such provisions once they
are agreed upon by the parties.
When the arguments for distinguishing between grievance arbitration
and new contract arbitration are analyzed there does not seem to be any
strong reason supporting the distinction, as far as court enforcement of such
agreements is concerned. It is not unreasonable to assume that the parties
were aware of both the benefits and the burdens presented by inclusion in
their contract of a provision for new contract arbitration, and it clearly is
not a proper judicial function to rewrite the collective bargaining agreement.
Rather, the function of the court should be merely to enforce those provi-
sions agreed upon by the parties. By developing distinctions between griev-
ance and new contract arbitration and enforcing the former but not the
latter, the court is, in effect, imposing upon the parties involved, its own
views of the best policy for resolving disputes. In the area of labor disputes,
this has never been considered a proper exercise of the judicial function.
If the national labor policy had been more favorable regarding court
enforcement of arbitration agreements, the court in Potter Press would not
have been forced to create a distinction which, in retrospect, appears con-
trived. As noted above, Westinghouse and General Electric made such a deci-
sion almost impossible. Since the decision in Potter Press there has been a
major change in the national labor policy. The Supreme Court has not only
moved away from its restricted interpretation of section 301, as expressed
in Westinghouse, but it has developed an interpretation quite favorable to
arbitration.
38 See 393 F.2d at 226.
" See M. Handsaker, Arbitration & Contract Disputes, in Challenges to Arbitration:
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators 78, 84
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Handsaker].
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M. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 301: AFTER Potter Press
The first Supreme Court case to display this new attitude was Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills," decided one year after Potter Press. This
case is probably the single most significant decision concerning arbitration
brought under section 301, for it marked the actual turning point in the
labor policy. In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court granted
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate a grievance dispute, and
decided that federal substantive law, to be fashioned from our national labor
policy, should govern section 301 cases. 4 ' Drawing on Judge Wyzanski's
opinion in American Thread, the Court determined that the intent of Con-
gress, in passing section 301, was to make arbitration agreements enforceable
in federal courts. The national labor policy was designed to be an instrument
to further "industrial peace," and arbitration was one such means for achiev-
ing this peace:12
 The decision, in effect, allowed for the creation of a com-
plete body of federal substantive law to promote smoother relations between
labor and management through the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.
The Lincoln Mills Court distinguished Westinghouse, claiming that the
latter involved a question of union standing to sue while the former was
concerned with arbitration proceedings. 43 As might be expected, the decision
drew an angry dissent from Justice Frankfurter, based upon his reading of
the legislative intent in section 301. justice Frankfurter could not dismiss
Westinghouse as easily as did the majority, and felt that the constitutional
issues which had been avoided there could not be answered by application of
federal law under section 301 proceedings. 44
Despite Justice Douglas' attempt to distinguish Westinghouse, Lincoln
Mills actually did overrule many aspects of the Westinghouse decision, or at
least the opinion of the three member plurality, by greatly expanding the scope
of section 301. Lincoln Mills stated that federal law would apply under sec-
tion 301, while the holding in Westinghouse implied that state law would
apply. Lincoln Mills also found no problems in the question of congressional
authorization of jurisdiction, unlike Westinghouse. Finally, the Lincoln Mills
Court thought that federal courts could manage to fashion a body of their
own law to apply to these proceedings, while Westinghouse had stated that
this development would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
In a companion case to Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court reviewed the
First Circuit opinion in General Electric.'" Although the Court affirmed the
lower court decision, its opinion was based on a different line of reasoning.
The Lincoln Mills Court said that section 301, not the United States Arbi-
tration Act, furnished its own basis for enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements to arbitrate. Thus, the lower court should not even have looked
40 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
41 353 U.S. at 456.
42 See id. at 455.
43 Id. at 456 n.6.
44 Id. at 461-62.
45 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
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to the Arbitration Act in its decision." Had this decision been handed down
before Potter Press, Judge Wyzanski would not have needed a statutory
basis for the enforcement of a "quasi-legislative" arbitration agreement, and
could have applied federal common law which he would fashion from the
national labor policy as determined by the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts. Until the Supreme Court spoke in Lincoln Mills and General Elec-
tric, however, it would have been very difficult for Judge Wyzanski to apply
this line of reasoning. It is ironic that Judge Wyzanski, who wrote the ba-
sically progressive decision in American Thread, was bound by the regressive
decisions in Westinghouse and General Electric in Potter Press, yet was later
vindicated by the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills and General Electric.
After the Lincoln Mills and General Electric cases, the Supreme Court
went on to develop an even stronger national labor policy favoring arbitra-
tion and, as a corollary, the use of section 301 as a means of settling labor
disputes. The next major cases were a series of decisions known as the
Steelworkers trilogy.47 These cases can be read as "not only recognizing
arbitration as an acceptable method of resolving labor disputes, but actively
encouraging it."45
 In the Warrior opinion, for example, the Court stated,
"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage."' The Court stated also:
[I]n the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation.
Here [in a labor dispute] arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different func-
tions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement,
the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial
agreements has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes
under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself. 5°
Since the trilogy other Supreme Court cases have strengthened the
national labor policy favoring arbitration. In one of these, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, the Court stated:
This Court has in the past recognized .the central role of
arbitration in effectuating national labor policy....
The preference of national labor policy for arbitration as a
46
 See id. at 548.
47 The "Steelworkers Trilogy" is the common name given to the three cases: United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
48 393 F.2d at 226.
49 363 U.S. at 582-83.
5 ° Id. at 578.
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substitute for tests of strength between contending forces could
be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so demanded."
It is submitted that by this time in the development of section 301, the
Court would not consider the differences between grievance and new contract
arbitration as sufficient reasons to "compellingly demand" a policy of non-
enforcement of a provision to arbitrate in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. This conclusion becomes especially apparent when one remembers the
weakness of the reasoning for the distinction as far as court enforcement
of the provision is concerned.
IV. THE Piedmont CASE
These later cases provide a much stronger foundation for a court to
apply federal common law under section 301 than existed at the time of
Potter Press. They also imply that this common law should be such as to
favor arbitration as a means for resolving industrial strife. In so doing,
they led to the almost inevitable decision in Piedmont, which agreed to
enforce such provisions. There, the court had neither Westinghouse nor
General Electric as obstacles preventing the enforcement of the agreement,
and had available the later cases to encourage enforcement. Thus, the court
felt free to enforce those agreements that had been reached by the parties
during the collective bargaining sessions.
We must assume that either the parties mutually agreed on this
provision [to arbitrate the terms of a new contract] from the start
or that one of the parties secured it during the give and take of
the collective bargaining. In either case, as long as it is not against
the national labor policy, which it certainly is not, it is entitled to
enforcement along with any other provision agreed upon by the
parties. Nothing would be more out of step with our national labor
policies than for courts to refuse to enforce a voluntary agreement
to arbitrate differences. 52 (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
A reading of Piedmont readily indicates the court's awareness of the
changes in national labor policy since Potter Press. First, the case recognizes
the problems that Westinghouse and General Electric had posed for Judge
Wyzanski in the writing'of Potter Press.53
 Next, the Piedmont court realized
that Lincoln Mills "substantially eroded the foundation of Potter Press," 54
and that the Supreme Court decision in General Electric constituted an even
"more direct attack" on the First Circuit's position. 55 Finally, the Piedmont
court went on to point out the more recent cases which have furthered the
al 376 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1964). Cf. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery &
Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1962).
52 Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Union v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393 F.2d
221, 227 (1968).
53 Id. at 224.
54 Id. at 225.
55 Id.
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favorable attitude toward arbitration as a means for resolving industrial
strife.56
While at this point in the discussion the recognition of these changes
may appear obvious, other courts have in recent years been faced with the
question of judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate new contracts,
and either have failed to recognize the changes or have recognized them
but minimized their importance. These cases demonstrate that the question
of court enforcement of agreements to arbitrate the terms of new contracts
is still an open one. In so doing, they make Piedmont more than a single
decision enforcing a labor agreement between a union and a company. The
Piedmont decision can thus be viewed as the culmination of the changes
in the national labor policy over the past decade, and the contrary decisions
can be viewed as the ties holding us to the Potter Press case and past labor
policy.
V. NEW CONTRACT ARBITRATION: OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Besides the Potter rule in the First Circuit, several district courts and
one circuit court have refused to compel arbitration for new contract terms.
The Fifth Circuit, in Austin Mailers Union No. 136 v. Newspapers, Inc.,"
refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate new contract terms. The case
was partially based upon the opinion in Potter Press, with no special aware-
ness of the changes in national labor policy between 1956 and 1963, or at
least no awareness of how these changes affect the issue of new contract
arbitration. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals merely regarded Potter
Press as "correctly decided."55 The Austin case can be distinguished from
both Potter Press and Piedmont on the basis of the actual collective bar-
gaining contract involved, but it does rest, to an extent, on the distinction
drawn in Potter Press between "quasi-legislative" and grievance arbitration.
Further, the lower court opinion in the case states that the United States Arbi-
tration Act, "does not apply to quasi-legislative matters but is concerned
only with the enforcement of quasi-judicial awards .. . ." 59 Thus, the district
court in Austin seems to ignore the Supreme Court decisions in Lincoln Mills
and General Electric, not to mention the later cases reinforcing those two
decisions.
Another district court," recognizing the recent changes in national
labor policy toward arbitration, also refused to compel arbitration for new
contract terms. It based its decision partially upon the fact that the parties
had not intended such arbitration, but it also relied on and concurred in the
reasoning of Potter Press.
Finally, a district court in International Typographical Union Local
No. 21 v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., refused to compel arbitra-
tion for issues relating to new contracts." Recognizing the recent cases
56 Id. at 226.
57 329 F,2d 312 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
58 Id. at 313.
59 226 F. Supp. 600, 602 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
00 Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
01 247 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Cal. 1965). See also In re Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., 199
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enlarging the scope of section 301 and the federal labor policy favoring
arbitration, the court quoted extensively from Potter Press, referring to it
as "a decision which has met with significant judicial approval . . 
."G2 It is
hard to reconcile this court's knowledge of national labor policy with its
approval of Potter Press. The court in Piedmont noted these cases:
While the Company refers the court to a number of recent deci-
sions affirming the holding of Potter Press, these cases are entitled only
to the remaining force and validity underlying the rationale of
Judge Wyzanski's opinion. More persuasive are the reasoning and
conclusions of the opinions, equal in number, challenging the sta-
tutory predicate of Potter Press in light of more recent Supreme
Court decisions, supra. We cast our lot with the latter group. 63
(Footnotes omitted.)
VI. NEW CONTRACT ARBITRATION IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Thus far, the basic questions that have been discussed relate to judicial
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate the terms of new contracts. Very
few cases have actually been presented to the courts concerning new contract
arbitration, and one might conclude that this fact proves that arbitration
agreements of this type are seldom used. Of all collective bargaining agree-
ments, the number which make provisions for arbitration of new contracts
is extremely small. Further, only a small percentage of all arbitration agree-
ments reach the courts," as most are voluntarily accepted by the parties.
Arbitration for new contracts is used, however, and its use may well be
expanding in the near future.
For parties considering whether to include a provision providing for
arbitration of a new contract, there are arguments both for and against
its use. The arguments against such provisions are essentially the same as
were presented against court enforcement of the agreements. The "too risky"
argument, the desire of the parties to control their own economic destiny,
and the desire of the leaders of the groups involved to maintain their positions
through the power which they wield during the collective bargaining for
new contracts inhibit the use of such agreements. One comment on the topic
concludes, "In short, the contract arbitrator would in fact legislate in wide
F. Supp. 103 (D.P.R. 1961) where the court, sitting in the First Circuit, indicated that it
was bound to follow Potter Press.
62
 247 F. Supp. at 966.
63
 393 F.2d at 227. This latter group, to which the court in Piedmont was referring,
includes several cases which clearly recognize that Potter Press is no longer good law.
See Builders Ass'n v. Laborers District Council, 326 F.2d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964) ("[Potter] is far too weak a peg upon which to hang a
reversal. . . ."); see Division No. 892, Street Ry. Employees v. M.K. & 0. Transit Lines,
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 351, 356 (ND. Okla. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 488 (10th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963) ("[Potter] is at odds with the rulings of the
Supreme Court"); see A. Seltzer & Co. v. Livingston, 253 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 361 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966). It is interesting to note that both Austin Mailers,
refusing to compel arbitration for new contract terms, and Builders Ass'n, refusing to
restrain arbitration were both denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, 377 U.S. 985
(1964); 377 U.S. 917 (1964).
64 Handsaker at 81-82.
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areas and in so doing would take over—by voluntary default, if you will
—the prime responsibility of the parties. No amount of reappraisal will
convince many unions or managements to accept this." 65
The principal argument in favor of such agreements relates to the
desire of both the parties involved and the general public to minimize strikes.
It is thought that arbitration agreements for new contract terms will reduce
the large profit and wage losses that are incurred through strikes and lockouts.
Also, it is felt that new contract arbitration may strengthen the collective
bargaining process because " f i] t may obviate the possible coming of com-
pulsory arbitration."66 "While the general attitude is to hold that such
arbitration is not useful or suitable, it is interesting to note in some of our
recent major disputes, one side or the other has suggested arbitration of
contract terms."67
In the examination of the situations in which new contract arbitration
is used, the particular industry involved is a significant factor. In areas
where a strike is most likely to cause severe harm, new contract arbitration
is more likely. Such areas as transit, public utilities, printing, publishing and
textiles have all made attempts to use new contract arbitration."
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that there are large and open
possibilities for new contract arbitration in the near future, despite the fact
that it may not have been used to a great extent in the past. As labor disputes
become more costly the need for peaceful resolution of such disputes becomes
greater. This conclusion is not to say that courts should, in any manner,
force such forms of arbitration upon the parties. But, as has been illustrated,
failure to enforce such agreements, when written in the collective bargaining
agreement, is totally out of step with the national labor policy. Full play
should be given to the means that the parties have chosen in their collective
bargaining sessions for the resolution of disputes. Potter Press could not do
so because of the restrictive cases which had preceded the decision. This
comment has attempted to show the context surrounding Potter Press, and
the evaporation of these restrictive policies in the last decade. The inevitable
result was the opinion delivered by the Fourth Circuit in Piedmont, and
that court's willingness to compel arbitration if that is the method chosen
by the parties for resolving disputes. Now, it can be hoped that the jurisdic-
tions which have followed Potter Press will move in the direction that our
national labor policy has favored, and that the issue of court enforcement
of new contract arbitration will soon become history.
ALAN I. SILBERBERG
65 3. Waddleton, Discussion in Challenges to Arbitration: Proceedings of the Thir-
teenth Annual Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators 92, 95 (1960).
• 66
 Handsaker at 92.
67 Id. at 80-81.
65 See id. at 81.
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